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In the

SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
PHERREL DRAPER,
Pla.intiff and R·espondent,
vs.
J. B. & R. E. WALKER, INC.,
a corporation,
Defendant and Appellan.t.

Case No.
7214

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Plaintiff in his complaint claims to be th~ owner of
property therein described and alleges that the Old Mill
Tavern, Inc., a corporation, in May of 1942 filed of
record a mortgage in which the Old Mill Tavern, Inc.
mortgaged certain property, including plaintiff's property, to the defendant corporation. The complaint sets
forth the fact that plaintiff had made a demand upon
the defendant corporation, as mortgagee, to release the
property from the mortgage and alleges the refusal of the
defendant corporation to execute the release form preSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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sented to it. The prayer of the complaint asks for the
determination of the Court that the mortgage is null and
void as to the property therein described and for damages in the sum of $547.00.
The defendant filed a motion to strike from the complaint all allegations as to damages as contained in Paragraph 9 of the complaint and filed a general and special
demurrer to the complaint and particularly to Paragraph

9.
At the hearing on the demurrer and motion to strike,
counsel for plaintiff submitted that the special demurrer
was well taken, and, the demurrer and motion having
been taken under advisement by the Court, both pleadings were subsequently denied by the Court in their entirety. Defendant then filed its answer in which it admitted that the plaintiff was the owne~ of the property,
disclaimed any right or title to the property and consented that judgment be entered quieting plaintiff's title
against the defendant.
At the trial of the cause the plaintiff moved to
amend the complaint by asking for an order of the Court
requiring the defendant to release the mortgage of record which amendment was permitted over the objection
of the defendant.
The testimony of the plaintiff. was to the effect that
some five years after the mortgage was of record he
found out about it when he sought to obtain a loan on
the property and at that time had a release prepared for
which he paid $25.00 and which he submitted to the deSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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fendant for execution. All of this was done before any
attempt had been made to contact the defendant corporation. The plaintiff as Page 43 of the transscript states
he was employed at $14.00 a day and received double
time for his Saturday and Sunday work. He claims his
damages for the time expended on Saturdays and Sundays which are double time days for him in attempting
to make contacts with the defendant corporation to secure the release. The plaintiff and the President of the
defendant corporation live within the same vicinity in
Cottonwood in Salt Lake County, and Plaintiff never attempted to reach him at the office or at his home and
yet on one occasion the plaintiff claims he made a trip
to Ogden to try to locate Mr. Walker when he didn't
know nor is there any evidence that Mr. Walker was in
Ogden or doing any work in Ogden, and the testimony
further shows that the plaintiff never tried to locate Mr.
Walker at his home or his office before he left on the
Ogden trip as appears at Page 81 of the transcript.
When the plaintiff contacted the office girl at the
defendant corporation after he had spent his time going
to Ogden, he was immediately informed to contact counsel for defendant, and several conferences were then held
and a release prepared to be executed and an understanding arrived at that a release would be given on each
party putting up the sum of $30.00, having a survey
made of the property line and the fence line readjusted
to meet the true survey line. This appears at Page
69 of the Record. The plain tiff states that he has a violent temper and being provoked in missing an appointSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

4
ment at which he was late he then determined not to proceed under the agreement for the survey, and this suit
was commenced. AU of this appears at Page 71 of the
Record.
At Page 92 of the Record appears the testimony
showing that a complete understanding had been arrived
at between counsel, providing for the survey and correcting of the fence lines to meet the results of the survey.
At Page 93 of the Record is the testimony showing
that the mortgage between the Old Mill corporation and
J. B. and R. E. Walker corporation had never been paid.
The Court took the matter under advisement and
subsequently entered its judgment quieting the title of
the plaintiff in the property and affirmatively directing
the defendant to execute a release of the mortgage and
giving to the plaintiff judgment of $397.00 against the
defendant together with costs of $13.20.
SPECIFICATION OF ERRORS

1. The Court erred in overruling the general demurrer of the defendant corporation.
2. The Court erred in overruling both grounds of
the special demurrer of the defendant corporation.
3. The Court erred in denying the defendant's motion to strike Paragraph 9 from the complaint.
4. The Court erred in making its fifth Finding of
Fact in this that it found that the plaintiff has at all times
refused and failed to release or cancel the mortgage,
which finding is contrary to the evidence; that though
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the word "plaintiff" may have been used inadvertently,
should the word be ''defendant,'' said finding is still contrary and is not supported by the evidence.
5. The Court erred in its sixth Finding of Fact
wherein it found that plaintiff has suffered damages by
reason of the refusal to release the mortgage by the defendant in the sum of $225.00 for attorneys' fees for the
reason that said finding~ is contrary to law and not supported by the evidence.
6. The Court erred in its sixth Finding of Fact
wherein it found that plaintiff has suffered damages in
the sum of $172.00 by reason of 'loss of time in that said
finding is contrary to law and ~ot supported by the evidence.
7. The Court erred in its 7th Finding of Fact
wherein it found that J. B. Walker was an officer of the
Old Mill Tavern, Inc., and the defendant corporation for
the reason that said finding is not supported by the evidence, is contrary to the law and is outside of any issue
involved in this proceeding.
8. The Court erred in making its second Conclusion of Law wherein the Court concludes that defendant
should be awarded judgment in the sum of $397.00 for the
reason that said conclusion is contrary to law.
9. The Court erred in its second Conclusion of Law
wherein it assessed costs in the sum of $13.20 for the
reason that said conclusion is contrary to law and there
has been no cost bill filed in this case.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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10. The Court erred in its third Conclusion of Law
requiring an order of the court issued to the defendant
to release its mortgage of record, as said conclusion is
contrary to law.
11. The Court erred in entering its judgment and
decree in favor of the plaintiff ordering the defendant
to deliver to the plaintiff a release of the mortgage described in said judgment, as said order is contrary to the
law.
12. The Court erred in entering its judgment and
decree awarding damages to the plaintiff and against the
defendant as appears in Paragraph 3 of said judgment
in the sum of $397.00 for the reason that such judgment
- and decree is contrary to the law.
13. 'The Court erred in entering its judgment as
appears in Paragraph 3 thereof awarding to the plaintiff costs in the sum of $13.20 as said judgment is not
supported by a cost bill and is contrary to law.
14. The Court erred in permitting the plaintiff to
make the amendment to the complaint, as appears at
Page 41 of the Record, for the reason that said amendment is contrary to law, was not made timely, and changed
the cause of action without permitting the defendant an
opportunity to clarify said issues by pleading or preparation to meet said new issue.
15. The Court erred in its rulings on the presentation of evidence in overruling defendant's objections and
permitting plaintiff to introduce testimony as to damage suffered by plaintiff.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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ARGUMENT

I.
The Defendant Is Not Liable To Plaintiff For The Damages
Provided In 78-3-8, U .C.A. 1943.
For the assistance of the Court this statute provides:
''If the mortgagee fails to discharge or release
any mortgage ,after the same has been fully satisfied, he shall be liable to the mo.rtg~agor for double
the damages resulting from such failure. Or the
mortgagor may bring an action against the mor.t-7
gagee to compel the discharge or release of the
mortgage after the same has been satisfied; and
the judgment of the court must be that the mortgagee discharge or release the mortgage and pay
the mortgagor the costs of suit, and all damages
resulting from such failure.''
Under this section the cause of the action which it gives
is specified:

(a) In favor of the mortg,ager and against the
mortgagee in those circumstances where a mo,rtgage has
b~en fully satisfied.
(b) The other situation provided by this section is
that the mortgagor may bring an action against the mortgagee to compel the release of a mortgage after the sam,e
has been satisfied, in which instance the court must order
the mortgagee to release and discharge the mortgage and
pay the mortgagor the cost of suit and all damages resulting from such failure.
In the case of Hasquet v. Big West Oil Company,
29 Fed. R. 2d Page 78, the court sets forth the fundamental rule :
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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''No right of action for damages exists at
common law from failure to satisfy a mortgage or
to release or discharge a lien or other claim
against real property.''
This proposition is further substantiated in the case of
Morrill v. Title, 162 P. 360, in which the court states:
"It was stated that no damages were recoverable at common law for failure to satisfy a mortgage * * * and that the only right of action was in
equity. That this is undoubtedly true is clearly
shown by the absence of decisions allowing damages under the common law and by the course of
'legislation in the United States. * * * To approve
the rule contended for by counsel for plaintiffs
would be nothing less than to engage in judicial
legislation which we must refuse to do.''
The further proposition has been substantiated in
many cases that a statute such as 78-3-8, U.C.A. 1943, is
penal in nature and will be narrowly construed, and the
relief to be granted under that statute will not be extended beyond its terms, nor will any theory of subrogation be indulged in to extend the relief permitted by
such a statute. A few of the cases so holding are the following: Osborn v. Hocker, 160 Ind. 1, 66 N.E. 42; Murphy v. Fleming, 69 Mich. 185, 36 N.W. 787; Wing v.
Union Cent. L. Ins. Co., 155 Mo. A. 356, 137 S.W. 11;
Bullington v. Lowe, 94 Okla. 234, 221 P. 502; Brandon
v. Garland, 211 Ala.150, 100 So.132.
One of these cases, that of Hope v. United Savings
and Loan Association, 60 P. 2d 737, was an action in
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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which parties were seeking to extend the benefit of such
a right of action of the mortgagor to one beyond that
class:
''The facts are as follows : The defendant in
error, who was plaintiff below, and will he so
designated in this opinion, brought an action to
foreclose a real estate mortgage, claiming a further Hen in addition to the principal which had
been discharged. Plaintiffs in error, who will he
hereinafter designated as defendants, in answer
to plaintiff's petition, denied plaintiff's right to
any further lien and filed a cross-action for penalty under section 7642, C.O.S. 1921 (section 11266,
0.8.1931). The defendants were not the original
mortgagors, but were subsequent purchasers of
the real estate and owned the same when this action was commenced. There was judgment sustaining defendants' demurrer to plaintiff's evidence;
also judgment denying defendants relief on their
cross-action. Defendants appeal from the judgment denying relief on their cross-petition.
"Defendants in their petition in error brief
several questions, including that of novation, in
order to bring themselves within the status above
cited. 'This question was not pleaded below. And,
although it is insisted that evidence on the question was introduced without objection, the same
falls short for such purpose, in that the original
mortgagor was not released from the debt.
'' ( 1) We are of the opinion that there is but
one question involved in this case; that is, whether
or not the subsequent purchaser of mortgaged
real estate may recover the forfeit provided by
section 11266, supra. On the authority of. the following cases decided by this court it seems conSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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elusive that statutes penal in their nature must
be strictly construed and limited to operate only
in favor of those included in the statutory description of designation: Territory ex rel. Johnston v. Woolsey, 35 Okl. 545, 130 P. 934; Baugh
v. Little ,et al., 140 Okl. 206, 282 P. 459; Bullington
v. Lowe, 94 Okl. 234, 221 P. 502.
'' (2) It is true that the precise question here
presented has not heretofore been decided by this
court, but the cited cases clearly disclose that the
rule of strict construction is applied to such
statutes in confining their operation, and there is
no provision therein that the rights conferred
thereby shall extend to the assignee of the mortgagor, and we do not now feel justified in extending the statute by implic.ation to include such persons. We find that this provision of our statute
has had consideration by the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for 'the Eighth Circuit in
the case of Capps v. U. S. Bond & Mortgage Co.,
274 F. 357, and there the court, after reviewing
authorities of eminent standing, held that the
statute did not apply in cases such as this. We
agree with the reasoning and conclusion in such
opinion.''
In the case of Ernest Graham v. Edward Sinderman, 238 Mich. 210, 213 N.W. 200, an owner of property
mortgaged the property to a broker who forged the
documents so given him and sold them to the defendant.
In that case the plaintiff owner of the property who had
never received any consideration for his mortgage sought
to have it released of record and to recover double damages against the defendant. The court refused to permit
a recovery under such a statute as ours, stating:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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"Plaintiff asks that defendant be made to
pay the penalty fixed by statute for refusal to
discharge the mortgage. This may not be done.
The statute relates to mortgages s'(J)tisfiled by payment or f1tll performance of the conditions thereof."
We submit that the cause of action permitted by this
statute rests only in one who is a mortgagor and who is
amortgagor whose mortgage has been fully satisfied. In
the principal case the plaintiff was never a party to the
mortgage involved. There is no contradiction to the fact
that the mortgage has never been satisfied. The authorities we have cited above are clear to the effect that the
term "mortgagor" will not be enlarged upon to include
one whose property has been included in the mortgage.
There is no relationship between the Old Mill Tavern,
Inc., and the plaintiff. There is no showing that the
plaintiff ever before or after the mortgage was placed
of record derived his property from or through the Old
Mill Tavern, Inc. In order to permit a cause of action
in the plaintiff it is incumbent upon the plaintiff to
bring himself within the class of a mortgagor. It is inconceivable of any theory under which the court could
assume to make the plaintiff a mortgagor in any respect
because he has never submitted his property as being
subject to the provisions of the mortgage nor was there
in any way any benefit he received by reason of the
mortgage. It is likewise inconceivable that because some
third person places a mortgage upon my property that I
thereby become a party to the mortgage. As impossible
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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as it appears to formulate any theory upon which the
plaintiff could become a mortgagor or come within such
a class, it becomes further impossible to understand how
he can receive the benefit of the statute which permits
relief only in those instances where the mortgage has
been satisfied. 'The only evidence in the entire case and
the actual fact i'S that this mortgage has not been paid.
We submit that there is no cause of action to the
plaintiff under the provisions of this statute, and the
court is entirely and grossly in error in permitting the
plaintiff to recover by virtue of its provisions.

n.
The Court Erred In Permitting The Amendment In Allowing The Affirmative Relief For The Release Of The Mortgage And In Denying The Motion To Strike And The Special
Demurrer, All Of Which Are Combined Under This One Argument.

As indicated in connection with the statute 78-3-8,
there are two options as to the cause of action available
to the plaintiff. It is submitted that he could avail himself of only one of them and not both. In other words,
he may sue for double damages or he may sue to have
the mortgage released and aH damages from such failure, or he could sue in equity to quiet title again!St the
land.
It is submitted that upon the plaintiff bringing his
cause of action, as set forth in his complaint, his complaint was fatally defective and did not state a cause of
action to permit the recovery of any relief other than
that of quieting title, because there is nowhere contained
in bythe
complaint
any
allegation
thatby the
the
mortgage
had Services
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been satisfied. There is no allegation of payment appearing whatsoever.
The defendant was unable to determine from plaintiff's complaint which of the two causes of action provided by 78-3-8 the plaintiff was pursuing, or whether
an action only to quiet title.
It is submited that, under special demurrer, we were
entitled to have this theory clarified, were entitled to
be advised in any event.

m.
The Court Erred In Entering Its Judgment Awarding The
Plaintiff Damages, As There Was No Evidence Or Findings
Upon Which Such Judgment Could Be Predicated.

We are combining under this argument our specifications of error 5, 6, 8, 12 and 15.
In this matter the evidence introduced over defendant's objection as to damage was to costs and time lost
by the plaintiff long prior to any demand for release
which was made on the defendant corporation and would
not be competent in any event. As a second proposition,
it is submited that the time which the plaintiff took off
and his time in court, all of which he was permitted to
testify to, could not be included as an element of damage, particularly when it appears that the time for these
appointments was not time which required him to lose
work.
The findings do not show what the element of damage
was, whether from time loss, loss from interest on mortgage, or any other elements claimed by the plaintiff, and
are so uncertain that they would not support the conSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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elusion or judgment as to any damage suffered by the
plaintiff.
IV.
The ·Court Erred In Awarding To The Plaintiff Attorney's
Fees.

There was no known evidence introduced in this
case as to any work that had been done by an attorney
in this case nor was any testimony introdueed as to the
reasonable value of any such work, and under the determinations of this court we submit that the court must
require testimony before entering such judgment. It is
further submitted that the item of attorney's fees is not
recoverable under the penalty provided by this statute
as it would not be an element of damage recovera;hle to
the plaintiff unless specifically provided as such by the
statute.

v.
The Court Erred in Entering Judgment For Costs With·
out A 'Cost Bill.

As there was no waiver or stipulation in this case,
we submit that the court erred in ·entering judgment including and specifying the costs recoverable by the plaintiff. This court has so often ruled that Wie will not add
length to this brief by citing authorities for the fact
that those costs are only recoverable upon the furnishing
of a cost bill.
Respectfully submitted,
McKAY, BURTON, NIELSON
and RICHARDS
Att·o·rneys for Defendant
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute
and Library Services
andof Museum
A·pp1ellant.
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

